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INTRODUCTION

Are independent agencies truly independent of presidential control? By
placing limits on the President's power to appoint and remove independent
agency heads as well as mandating limits on the number of the President's own
partisans that can be appointed, Congress made use of an institutional design
that sought to limit presidential control of independent agencies. 1 But do these
statutory limits, in fact, protect independent agencies from presidential
domination? After all, commissioners need not serve out their term, so it may
be that a President is able to appoint a majority of commissioners shortly after
he takes office. Moreover, partisan rules may be ineffectual, as Presidents may
appoint turncoats from the opposition party. For example, a Democratic
President may appoint a Republican whose politics are more closely allied with
Democrats than with Republicans.
In the pages that follow, we will examine these questions through an
empirical analysis of presidential control of independent agencies.
Specifically, we will look at turnover rates among commissioners, the impact
of party turnover in the White House on these rates, the amount of time that it
takes a President to get his nominees through the Senate, and whether
commissioners from the party not in the White House ("opposition-party"
commissioners) are loyal to their party or to the President who appointed them.
• Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and
Mary.
•• Assistant Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs, Princeton University. Thanks to Gary Lawson for asking us to
participate in The Role of the Presidency in the 21st Century Conference. Thanks to Chris
Casey, Brian Sterling, and especially Pierce Blue for research assistance.
1
See discussion infra Part I.
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By examining these various measures of commissioner partisanship and the
President's ability to advance his policy agenda through independent agencies,
we will gain a handle on whether congressional efforts to statutorily limit
presidential control of independent agencies, in fact, meaningfully limit the
President. 2
Our initial hypothesis was that commissioner turnover was sufficiently great
that statutory limits on presidential powers to appoint and remove independent
agency heads did not impose any severe constraints. When we first started
talking about writing this paper around 2003, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) had just relaxed rules governing the cross-ownership of
television stations and newspapers. 3 This policy change seemed directly tied
to commissioner turnover at the FCC and, correspondingly, to President
Bush's ability to appoint commissioners who agreed with his policy
preferences. Shortly after his 2001 inauguration, President Bush appointed to
the FCC two Republican commissioners, Kevin Martin and Kathleen
Abernathy, and a Democratic commissioner, Michael J. Copps, who previously
worked for a conservative southern Democrat. 4 We speculated that these three
appointments allowed Bush to quickly transform the FCC into an agency that
would advance his policy priorities - so much so that the line separating
presidential influence over independent agencies from presidential influence
over executive agencies became blurred.
The data, as we will soon discuss, do not support our initial thesis about
commissioner turnover and the speed at which Presidents can appoint a
majority of ideologically-simpatico commissioners. 5 But the data do support
an even more interesting hypothesis - one that suggests greater presidential
control of independent agencies, although for reasons quite different than we

2 Most of our empirical analysis is original. Others, however, have examined related
questions. In particular, Daniel Ho wrote a first-rate study on the impact of statutory
partisan requirements on presidential control of independent agencies. See Daniel E. Ho,
Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan Requirements on
Regulation 18-31 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n, Working Paper No. 73, 2007), available at
http://law.bepress.com/alea/17th/art73/. Ho's study helped shape our thinking and we will
refer to it on several occasions in this Article.
3 See In re 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review- Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,790-91 (2003); see also
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004) (reviewing the validity of
the proposed 2003 rules).
4 Press Release, White House, President Bush Nominates Six Individuals To Serve in His
Administration (April 6, 2001 ), available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/04/20010406-7.htrnl. In 2005, Bush appointed Kevin Martin to be chair of the FCC.
Press Release, FCC, Kevin J. Martin Sworn in as Communications Commissioner (July 3,
2001 ), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/News_Releases/200 11
nrmcO lll.htrnl.
5 See discussion infra Part II.
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had initially suspected.6 Specifically, contrary to what we had thought, it is
taking Presidents longer and longer to appoint a majority of commissioners
from their political party. 7 Furthermore, opposition-party commissioners are
not turncoats loyal to the President who appoints them; instead, today's
opposition-party commissioners are ideological partisans committed to the
agenda of the opposition party. 8 Thus, statutory limits on the President's
appointment and removal powers are effective: opposition-party members do
not share the President's priorities and Presidents are unable to quickly appoint
a majority of commissioners.
The political polarization of Democrats and Republicans seems to account
for these two phenomena. Opposition-party senators agree with each other and
disagree with the policy priorities of the President and his party.
Consequently, opposition-party senators make use of holds and other delaying
strategies to see to it that the President nominates opposition-party
Commissioners loyal to the opposition party, not to the President. At the same
time, party polarization also explains why today's independent agencies are
more likely to agree with presidential preferences once the President appoints a
majority of his party to the agency. In particular, party polarization between
Democrats and Republicans means that party identity is an especially good
proxy for commissioner ideology. A majority Republican commission is likely
to agree with the policy priorities of a Republican President; a majority
Democratic commission is likely to resist those policy priorities. 9 In
demonstrating how party polarization shapes commissioner identity and
behavior, we highlight differences between today' s independent agencies and
pre-1980 independent agencies. Before 1980, modest party polarization was
the norm and, correspondingly, opposition-party senators did not use delaying
strategies to advance their agenda. Likewise, party identity was a less useful
proxy in predicting commissioner behavior. For these and other reasons, we
see the Reagan presidency as transformative - separating a period of modest
party polarization from a period of ever-increasing polarization.
In examining the profound impact of party polarization on presidential
control of independent agencies, our Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I
discusses how Congress uses the institutional design of independent agencies
to limit presidential control of these agencies. This discussion underscores the
primacy of appointment and removal limits to that institutional design. Part II
looks at whether Congress's institutional design works- looking at data about
commissioner turnover and lag times between presidential nomination and

6

See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part II.
8
See discussion infra Part III.
9
See discussion infra Part II. This is especially true on high-salience issues - where
Democrats and Republicans are likely to disagree with each other. See discussion infra Part
II. For this reason, some independent commissions are more likely to be politicized than
others.
7
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Senate confirmation. Part III will detail how party polarization contributes to
changes in commissioner turnover and time lags between nomination and
confirmation, and extends the analysis that takes place in Part II by comparing
commissioner turnover and lag times before and after the Reagan presidency.
Part III will also discuss how party polarization translates into the appointment
of commissioners who are far more likely to be party loyalists. In particular,
the opposition party in the Senate will make use of holds and other delaying
strategies (often on nominees from the President's own party) to ensure the
President appoints opposition-party commissioners who are acceptable to
opposition-party leaders. Part IV will serve both as a conclusion and as an
opportunity for us to discuss how changes in the appointment and confirmation
of commissioners influence presidential control of independent agencies. For
reasons already noted, we will argue that Presidents - once there is a majority
of commissioners from the President's party - have more influence on
independent-agency policymaking than ever before.
Party polarization
translates into party loyalty, meaning independent-agency heads from the
President's party are less likely to disagree with the President. 10
I.

THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

Congress's decision to designate an agency as independent (i.e., not under
the control of some cabinet agency or the Executive Office of the President) is
intended to limit presidential contro1. 11 After winning the White House, a
newly elected President - so the theory goes - cannot control independentagency decision making. 12 Instead, statutory partisan requirements, fixed
statutory terms, and for-cause limits on commissioner removal all work against
presidential control. 13 More to the point, assuming that some opposition-party
commissioners serve out their terms, a newly elected President will inherit a
commission that is likely to have members (perhaps a majority) that disagree
with his policy priorities. That is why the Senate Committee on Government
Operations spoke of partisan requirements as "an important restraint on the
President. " 14

10

See discussion infra Part III.
See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 589-91 (1984) .
. 12 See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and
Personnel Before a President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557 (2003).
13 See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 3-4 (2003).
14
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, 95TH CONG., STUDY ON FEDERAL
REGULATION : THE REGULATORY APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 31 {1977); see also PETER L.
STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 95-96 (2d ed. 2002); Cass R.
Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 103 (2000)
(opining that partisan membership requirements in independent regulatory commissions
may reduce an agency's tendency toward political polarization).
11
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Some combination of concerns about expertise, due process, and the likely
administrative actions of Presidents explains Congress's decision to constrain
the President this way. 15 Commission expertise is the traditional, "good
government" justification for Congress's choice to create independent
agencies. 16 Pointing to their inability to deal with the details of complex,
sectoral regulation in the legislative process, lawmakers see independent
agencies as a particularly good institutional design to offset limitations in the
legislative processP As one member said in the debate over the creation of
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC): "How much better this [the
proposal for an independent commission] is than to fix in advance by inflexible
law the whole body of rules to govern the most complex business known to our
civilization." 18 On this view, members of Congress have neither the expertise
nor the time to manage complicated and rapidly changing regulatory issues.
Independent agencies are preferred to executive agencies because long
commissioner tenure, staggered terms, and political insulation are intended to
facilitate a non-political environment where regulatory experts can apply their
knowledge to complex policy problems. 19
15 See LEWIS, supra note 13, at 27-29. Due process concerns were particularly salient
before Congress's 1946 enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a federal
statute mandating that government agencies adhere to due process norms. See infra note 19
and authorities cited therein.
16
See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1667, 1678 (1975).
17 See LEWIS, supra note 13, at 27-29.
18
17 Cong. Rec. 7290 (1886) (statement of Rep. Hitt) (debating the merits of opposing
bills to address railway regulation).
19 See LEWIS, supra note 13, at 3-4. Another justification for the creation of independent
commissions is that these commissions avoid constitutional problems. See id. at 22-23. In
particular, some members of Congress argued that the granting of regulatory power comes
with great risk to individuals and commercial interests. See McNollgast, The Political
Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORO. 180, 182-83 (1999).
Designing commissions and judicializing their procedures is one way of ensuring due
process rights for regulated interests. A related justification for the creation of independent
agencies was lawmaker concern about the delegation of quasi-legislative power to executive
branch actors. Before the 1946 enactment of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000),
independent - but not executive agencies - made use of quasi-judicial procedures when
crafting policy. The Supreme Court favorably cited this practice in its 1935 Schechter
Poultry decision. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42
( 1935). In explaining why Congress could not delegate power to the executive to determine
what is and is not "fair competition," the Court distinguished this impermissibly vague
delegation from Congress's granting of analogous power to the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). See id. at 552. For the Court, the FTC's determination of "unfair methods of
competition" was sensible because the FTC was a "quasi-judicial body" and "[p]rovision
was made for formal complaint, for notice and hearing, for appropriate findings of fact
supported by adequate evidence, and for [Article III] judicial review to give assurance that
the action of the commission is taken within its statutory authority." !d. at 533. With the
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While expertise may be part of the story, authority in complex regulatory
policy areas is also delegated to executive-branch bureaus. For example, the
regulation of the environment (Environmental Protection Agency), the
regulation of food and drugs (Food and Drug Administration), and the
enforcement of antitrust laws (Department of Justice) is delegated to
hierarchical executive-branch bureaus. Each of these areas is arguably as, or
more, complex than the regulation of the national railroads (ICC), securities
(Securities and Exchange Commission), and labor-management relations
(National Labor Relations Board). What then explains the creation of
independent commissions?
The short answer is "political realities," for "there is [otherwise] little rhyme
or reason as to Congress' designation of a particular agency as either a cabinet
agency or an independent regulatory commission. " 20 A burgeoning literature
in political science backs up this conclusion, 21 and while we think that
concerns of expertise and due process are not irrelevant, there is little doubt
that political calculations figure prominently in Congress's decision to delegate
power to an independent, non-executive, agency. 22 Most significantly,
members of Congress are more likely to delegate regulatory authority to
executive branch actors when they are from the same party or when they share
the political preferences of the President. 23 When members of Congress fear
the administrative influence of the current President on policies postenactment, they are more likely to create independent commissions to
implement their policies.24
For this very reason, the percentage of new agencies with insulating
characteristics correlates with periods of divided government. 25 During the
Republican Nixon and Ford administrations, for example, a Democratic
enactment of the AP A, executive agencies are now bound by due process requirements both
when crafting regulatory policy and when adjudicating disputes. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556557.
20 WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 68 (3d ed. 1997).
21 See generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS
(1999); MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1995); LEWIS, supra note 13; Nolan
McCarty, The Appointments Dilemma, 48 AM. J. PoL SCI. 413 (2004); Matthew D.
McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements
and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431 (1989); Terry M. Moe, The
Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN THE GoVERNMENT GoVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb
& Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989).
22 See Fox, supra note 20, at 68.
23 See David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Divided Government and the Design of
Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test, 58 J. POL. 373, 387-92
(1996).
24
See LEWIS, supra note 13, at 27-28.
25 See id. at 49-55.
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Congress was especially prone to cabin presidential power through limitations
on presidential appointment and removal authority.26 Likewise, Democratic
Congresses sought to limit the prerogatives of the Republican Reagan and
Bush I administrations by seeking to insulate new agencies from presidential
controi.2 7 In sharp contrast, the lowest percentages of insulation were during
the Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter administrations, when a Democratic
Congress was largely supportive of the political objectives of these Democratic
Presidents. 28
A particularly good example of this phenomenon is the creation of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). 29 In the early 1970s,
consumer groups had successfully pressured both the President and Congress
for a new agency. 30 In 1971, President Nixon proposed a new Consumer
Safety Administration to be located in the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare.3 1 Proponents in Congress, however, worried about Nixon's ties
to business interests, proposed an independent regulatory structure instead.32
The eventual CPSC was placed outside of existing bureaucratic structures and
outfitted with a commission structure. 33 To further insulate it from political
manipulation, commissioners were granted staggered seven-year terms.34
Democratic members of Congress were worried about the commitment of
Richard Nixon to consumer interests, and they worried about what his
management would mean for a new consumer agency in one of the cabinet
departments.35
Of course, immediate concerns about the impact of the current President are
not the only way politics works its way into decisions about creating
comm1sswns. Members of Congress worry not only about the current
President but also about the impact of future Presidents on agency policy and
implementation. If changing presidential administrations will create dramatic
policy change with long-term harm to social welfare, Congress will seek to
remove regulatory policy from presidential control. The most obvious
example of such a decision was the creation ofthe Federal Reserve in 1913.36
Some members of Congress, and the business interests supporting them, feared
that the short-term incentives of Presidents would be to use monetary and
26

See id. at 49, 54.
See id. at 54.
28
See id.
29 See Moe, supra note 21, at 289-97 .
3D See id. at 289-90.
31 /d. at 290.
3 2 See id. at 290-91.
33
/d. at 291.
34 /d.
35 /d. at 290-91.
36 See ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT
(1972).
27

REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
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banking regulation policies for political or electoral benefit to the detriment of
long-term economic stability and investment_37 They also worried that
electoral turnover in the White House could lead to flip-flopping monetary
policy, from loose to tight, depending upon the party in office. 38 The solution
to this problem was to insulate monetary policy decision making, as well as
part of banking regulation, in a Federal Reserve Board of Governors with fixed
ten- to fourteen-year terms. 39
For their part, Presidents typically see themselves as heads of the regulatory
state and fight tooth and nail to resist congressional delegations to independent
agencies. 4 Consider, for example, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Initially,
Roosevelt sought Supreme Court backing for his policy-based dismissal of
William Humphrey, a Federal Trade Commission member. 41 Humphrey sued
for back pay and won, with the Supreme Court concluding Congress could
statutorily limit the President's power to remove "quasi-legislative and quasijudicial" policymakers who disagree with presidential priorities. 42 Roosevelt
also pushed for a reorganization plan that would do away with independent
agencies by statute. 43 Through the Brownlow Committee, his Committee on
Administrative Management, Roosevelt sought to bring the independent
agencies "under the general supervision of Cabinet officers."44 Deeming

°

37
See id. at 153-55. This was seen most clearly in their efforts to limit political influence
on the Board of Governors and to increase banking influence on the board. See id. at 15558.
38
See id. at 154-56.
39
See id. at 153-55. The term length originally was ten years but was lengthened to
fourteen years in 1935. Compare Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 10, 38 Stat. 251,
260, with Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, § 203, 49 Stat. 684, 704.
40
Differences between presidential and congressional sensibilities are best illustrated by
Harry Truman's conflicting positions on the delegation of authority to regulate the nation's
waterways to the Interstate Commerce Commission. In 1938, then-Senator Truman strongly
backed the delegation; in 1946 President Truman opposed the delegation, arguing that
transportation policy was too fragmented under independent-agency control. See LEWIS,
supra note 13, at 21-22.
41
Roosevelt sacked Humphrey, a Coolidge appointee to the Federal Trade Commission
who supported big business and opposed the New Deal, because Roosevelt "[did] not feel
WILLIAM E.
that [Humphrey's] mind and [his] mind [went] along together."
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE
AGE OF ROOSEVELT 60 (1995). For an insightful discussion of this episode (from which
many of the claims in the balance of this paragraph are drawn), see id. at 52-81.
42
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). Enraged by this and
other anti-New Deal rulings, Roosevelt launched his failed plan to pack the Court with
Justices sympathetic to his policy agenda. On the linkage between Humphrey's Executor
and court-packing, see LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 41, at 79-80.
43
See RICHARD POLENBERG, REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT'S GOVERNMENT: THE
CONTROVERSY OVER EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, 1936-1939, at 187-88 (1966).
44 /d. at 25.
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independent agencies the "headless 'fourth branch of government,"' 45 the
Brownlow Committee argued that effective presidential management of the
administrative state required folding independent agencies into executive
departments. 46
And so it goes. Presidents pursue reorganization plans to expand their
power and fight off congressional efforts to insulate government agencies from
presidential control. 47 During periods of divided government, these skirmishes
are more intense; Congress is more likely to pursue such limits and the
President and Congress are more apt to be at policy loggerheads. 48 For
example, responding to congressional efforts to create an independent agency
in charge of environmental enforcement, President Nixon created the
Environmental Protection Agency by reorganization plan in 1970. 49 Presidents
Reagan and Bush I made use of their veto power in resisting congressional
efforts to create new repositories of independent litigating authority in the
Merit Systems Protection Board (during the Reagan years) and the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (during the Bush I years). 50
Needless to say, as the plethora of structural limits on presidential control of
the administrative state makes clear, Presidents sometimes agree to statutory
limits on their powers to administer government programs. With respect to
45

LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 148
(4th ed. 1998).
46
The 1938 Congress, however, had no interest in backing Roosevelt's plan: "fears and
anxieties produced by European dictatorship[s]" translated into congressional efforts to
cabin presidential power. POLENBERG, supra note 44, at 149. Roosevelt simply could not
overcome the specter of a centralized totalitarian regime. See Barry D. Karl, Constitution
and Central Planning: The Third New Deal Revisited, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 163, 188; Neal
Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 261-65 (1996)
(book review).
47
Presidentially appointed commissions established to examine the administration of the
executive branch have consistently sought to increase presidential control of the
administrative state. For example, in justifying some proposals made in 1971 to decrease
the number of independent agencies, the President's Advisory Council on Executive
Organization (the Ash Council) concluded that political insulation limits the accountability
of independent agencies to both the President and Congress. THE PRESIDENT's ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON
SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 4, 14-16 (1971). For a general overview of
presidentially appointed management commissions, see PERl E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE
MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY: COMPREHENSIVE REORGANIZATION PLANNING 1905-1996, at 33864 (2d ed., rev. 1998) (explaining the recurrent phenomenon of comprehensive executive
reorganization planning).
48
See discussion supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
49
Reorganization Plans Nos. 3 and 4 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Dec. 2, 1970),
reprinted in 84 Stat. 2086 ( 1970).
50 These two episodes are discussed in Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary
Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 273,
279-80 (1993).
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independent agencies, presidential disdain for inheriting an agency filled with
commissioners appointed by the President's predecessor is counterbalanced by
the President's desire to advance his policy goals by presiding over the
creation of a new commission. In particular, Presidents can have a lasting
impact on commission policy by appointing an initial slate of commissioners.
Because of fixed and staggered terms, Presidents can lock in a particular set of
commission policies into the next presidency more so than in an executive
branch bureau. If the current President and a majority in Congress worry about
losing power, creating a commission and stacking it with sympathetic
appointees is one way of protecting policies well into the future.
Yet the question remains: to what extent does political insulation limit
presidential control of independent agencies?
Congress sees political
insulation as a way to limit presidential power and is especially willing to push
for limits on the President's appointment and removal powers during periods
of divided government. The President, too, sees political insulation as a way to
limit presidential power. With the possible exception of the President's power
to advance his policy agenda by presiding over the creation of a new
independent agency, Presidents typically seek to centralize power in the White
House. 5 1 This is especially true during periods of divided government, as Part
III of this Article will make clear. 52 During these periods, Presidents are
especially concerned with agency heads breaking ranks with presidential
priorities.
But what if Presidents can get control of independent agencies relatively
quickly through appointments?
For example, if opposition-party
commissioners regularly retired after a party change in the White House, the
incoming President would be able to ensure that a majority of commissioners
came from his party, and might even be able to appoint a majority of them.
Likewise, if the Senate quickly rubber stamped presidential nominees to
independent agencies, Presidents could seek out turncoat commissioners who
would echo the President's policy preferences. 53 Parts II and III will consider
these questions. Part II will empirically evaluate the independence of the
independent commissions, focusing primarily on the length of time it takes
Presidents to gain control of a commission through appointments. Part III will
evaluate those findings, focusing on the role that party polarization plays in
shaping the respective actions of Presidents, commissioners, and Congress.
51 ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, MANAGING THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM: PRESIDENTIAL
LEADERSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE POLICY FORMULATION 18 (2002); Terry M. Moe, The
Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 235, 235 (John E.
Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985).
52
See discussion infra Part III.
53 As Daniel Ho puts it: "[a]necdota1 evidence abounds" that "presidents appoint [crossparty] commissioners differing formally in partisanship but who are otherwise identical in
viewpoint to the president." Ho, supra note 2, at 2. Ho, however, concludes that those
studies are in error - and that cross-party appointees are particularly loyal to the party from
which they come. See infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 88 B.U. L. Rev. 468 2008

2008]

NOT-SO INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

II.

469

THE DATA

To evaluate the independence of independent commissions we collected
data on the length of time it takes Presidents to appoint majorities to
commissions. We used publicly available data on commissioner tenure and
updated it through the Bush II presidency. 54 Specifically, we examined the
length of time it has taken Presidents from Warren Harding to George W. Bush
to appoint majorities to twelve different independent regulatory commissions. 55
We looked both at the time it takes Presidents to obtain a majority for their
party on the commission, and the time it takes them to appoint an absolute
majority of the commission's members. These two ways of evaluating
commission majorities reflect two different views about how commission
appointment politics works. If partisanship is the essence of commission
voting, then the pivotal moment for Presidents is when they obtain a majority
of their partisans on a commission. So, for Republican Presidents, the key
moment is when they get a majority of Republicans on a commission, and for
Democratic Presidents, a majority of Democrats. If, on the other hand,
Republican Presidents appoint Democratic commissioners who vote at least
part of the time like Republicans, and Democratic Presidents appoint
Repubtican commissioners who vote like Democrats, then the key moment for
the President and the commission is more likely to be when the president has
appointed a majority of commissioners. This is a key distinction to which we
return below.
During this time period, Presidents were able to obtain a majority on each
commission in all cases except one. 56 On average, Presidents were able to
obtain majorities for their party after nine or ten months. They were also able
54

This data was collected through an NSF funded research project (SES 00-95962).
DAVID C. NIXON, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONER DATA BASE (2005),
http://www2.hawaii.edu/-dnixon!IRC/. The unit of analysis is the commission within a
presidency (first term). There are ninety observations in the data.
55 These commissions include the Atomic Energy Commission, Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Election
Commission, Federal Maritime Commission, Federal Radio Commission, Federal Trade
Commission, National Labor Relations Board, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
56 We exclude the Federal Election Commission from these calculations since it has an
even number of commissioners and by law no more than one half can be ftom the same
political party. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(l) (2000). We also exclude from these calculations
all presidents in office when a commission was created, since they were able to make all of
the initial appointments. The case where a President was not able to appoint a majority was
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) during the Carter administration. For a
discussion of the NRC see Carter Nominating Physicist to Nuclear Agency Vacancy, WASH.
PosT, June 30, 1977, at 54. Had we included the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve, there would have been two more cases, the Kennedy and Nixon administrations.
See NIXON, supra note 54.
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to appoint an absolute majority of commissioners in most cases (ninety
percent). Not surprisingly, most of the cases where Presidents did not appoint
absolute majorities involved presidencies that did not last a full term (i.e.,
Harding, Kennedy, and Ford). It took individual Presidents longer on average
- twenty-six months - to appoint an absolute majority of the members (i.e.,
three of five commissioners, or four of seven commissioners). The disparity in
the amount of time it takes Presidents to get a party majority versus the time it
takes to appoint an absolute majority, again, illustrates the importance of the
members' ideology and behavior. If Republicans consistently vote like
Republicans and Democrats consistently vote like Democrats, then the
structure of independent commissions does not insulate as well from
presidential control. If, however, each commissioner votes like the President
that appointed him, then the structure insulates against new presidential
influence much more effectively and the influence of previous Presidents lasts
much longer into new presidential terms.
Whether the new President is from a different party than the last President
matters significantly for control. New Presidents from the same party as the
prior President obtain a party majority in one to two months on average
compared to thirteen to fourteen months for a new president from a different
party_57 Presidents who assume office after a President from their own party
have a built-in advantage since they frequently assume office with a majority
of their partisans already in place on commissions. Their task is to make
adjustments at the margins, perhaps by naming a new chair or slowly bringing
in partisans that are more loyal to them personally.
This is strikingly different from the task facing a President after a party
change. Presidents who assume office after a party change confront more
vacancies, particularly vacancies in positions formerly held by their own party.
Figure I graphs the average number of commission vacancies by whether or
not there has been a party change. The gray bars reflect total vacancies while
the black bars reflect vacancies in opposition-party seats on the commission.
As the figure suggests, there are more vacancies after a party change than
during an intra-party transition: 0.76 vacancies per commission versus 0.39,
which amounts to nine vacancies across the twelve commissions versus four or
five. On their face, the data would seem to imply that new Presidents after a
party change in the White House have the ability to reshape the commission in
their own image and get control quickly. Interestingly, however, the additional
vacancies exist for seats that were previously filled by commissioners from the
President's own party. There are actually fewer vacancies in seats formerly
held by the other party after a party change, and these are the seats that
Presidents must fill to change majorities. Instead, the new President must

57

Cases where presidents did not appoint majorities were coded as taking the full tenure
of the President's term for these calculations. The overall average of nine to ten months for
party majorities reflects the fact that about sixty percent of the cases were ones in which a
party change had occurred in the White House.
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immediately fill seats left open by his own party simply to ensure the party's
influence holds its ground on the commission. The task of filling vacancies in
slots filled by the President's own party slows down the process of getting
majorities of the President's own partisans on the commissions.
Figure I: Average Number of Commission Vacancies by Party Change in
the White House, 1921 to 2004
0.8
~

0.7

-~ 0.6
~

~ 0.5

.S?

-~

0.4

E

8 0.3
""g" 0.2
>

<

0.1
0
No Party Change
II Total Vacancies

Party Change
• Opposition Party Vacancies

One reason why there are more vacancies in Republican seats for
Republican Presidents (and vice versa) after a party change in the White House
is that Presidents leaving office usually select their own partisans for the
appointments that will last longest into the new administration. This means
that the staggered terms that expire first after a party change are systematically
more likely to be from the new President's own party. A second reason for the
surplus of vacancies in the President's own party is that opposition-party
commissioners stay on longer.
As Figure 2 shows, opposition-party
commissioners are much more likely to stay for their full terms. Such
commissioners probably stay longer precisely because they know that their
departure will open the door for the other party's President to influence
commission policies sooner. Many opposition commissioners, in fact, stay
after their terms have expired, until a successor has been nominated and
confirmed. 58

58

Nowadays, commissioners generalJy are more likely to stay after their terms expire.
For example, during the first term of the George W. Bush administration, one quarter of the
commissioners who left had been serving longer than their stipulated terms. During
President Eisenhower's first term, the percentage was closer to fifteen percent. From 1930
to 1980, the average commissioner stayed for nine to seventeen months less than his term
alJowed. From 1970 forward, the average commissioner began staying longer, so that by
the George W. Bush administration the average commissioner stayed only two months less
than his term allowed and more stayed longer.
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Figure 2: Tenure of Commissioners After a Party Change in White House
by Party of Commissioner
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Looking just at averages across this long time period masks consequential
changes in presidential commission politics over time. Importantly, it is now
taking Presidents longer and longer to appoint majorities. 59 While there is
variation from President to President (largely explained by whether there has
been a party change in the White House), there appears to be an increasing
trend. 6 Figure 3 graphs the average time it took Presidents to obtain a
majority of their partisans on the commissions in this study. The length of
time fluctuates substantially but shows an increase, particularly in recent years.
For example, it took an average of twenty months for Presidents Clinton and
George W. Bush to obtain Democratic and Republican majorities, respectively,
on the independent regulatory commissions (IRC) - which is longer than the
average. It also took them slightly longer to appoint absolute majorities (by

°

59

See infra p. 473 fig.3.
One of the puzzling aspects of this picture is the relatively short time it took President
Reagan to get party majorities on commissions at the same time that confirmation delays
were increasing. The puzzle has two explanations. First, the apparent confirmation delay
was driven by slow action on holdover commissioners - that is, the people he was
renominating took longer to get confirmed. So, they were already on the commissions, and
the confirmation delay did not matter for getting control of the commissions. To illustrate,
his first five new nominations were confirmed less than one month after nomination (SEC,
FCC, NRC, FCC, NRC). Four of these were Republican nominations, the longest delay for
a non-holdover nomination being less than three months. By contrast, the average delay for
a holdover was over four months. The Republican Senate was pretty good about moving
Reagan's new nominees through. Second, Reagan also made six recess appointments in his
first year, five Republicans and one Democrat (NLRB, FEC, EEOC). Confirmation delay
is, obviously, not a problem if nominees obtain recess appointments.
60
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approximately one month). Both of these averages are also higher than those
of their immediate predecessors.
Figure 3: Average Time to Get a Partisan Majority on IRCs

President

One reason for the increased delay is that it is taking longer for Presidents to
get commissioners confirmed. For example, at the end of 2007, none of the
commissioners on the Federal Election Commission had been confirmed for a
regular term. 61 Three were serving under recess appointments, two others were
serving in expired terms, and a sixth slot was vacant. The difficulty stemmed
from partisan disagreements between Republicans and Democrats in the Senate
over a package of appointees to be brought up for a vote. 62 Democratic
objections to one of the Republican nominees, Hans von Spakovsky, led to
four different holds being placed on the nominee in the Senate. 63 Republicans
opposed bringing the other nominees to the floor without von Spakovsky,
leading to a stalernate. 64 This squabble threatened to leave the FEC without a
quorum when the congressional session ended in December since those
61

See Matthew Mosk, Senate Battle Over FEC Nominee May Hamper Agency's Ability
to Act, WASH. Posr, October 26,2007, at Al9. The Consumer Product Safety Commission
has been hampered by a similar dispute. In May 2007, President George W. Bush's
nominee for chair, Michael Baroody, withdrew his nomination when it became apparent he
would not receive confirmation. No subsequent nominee was put forward for the position,
leaving the position on the three-person board vacant. As a result, the agency has not been
able to issue new rules or judgments. See Pete Yost, Consumer Commission Nominee
Withdraws, WASH. POST, May 23, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007 /05/23/AR2007052300897 .html.
62 Mosk, supra note 61.
On the Senate's increasing "hatching" of Republican and
Democratic nominees, see infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
63 Mosk, supra note 61.
64 Id.
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commissioners serving under recess appointments would be required to leave
at the end of the congressional session. 65
The FEC case is one example of how increasingly polarized parties have a
harder time coming to agreement over nominees. 66 Figure 4 graphs the
average delay between commissioner nomination and confirmation. The data
reveal a noticeable increase in confirmation delay over time, particularly
recently. Starting in the mid-l970s, there has been a noticeable increase in the
time between when a nomination was sent to the Senate and when the
nomination was confirmed. This helps explain the increase in time it takes
Presidents to appoint majorities.
Figure 4: Average Number of Months Between Nomination and
Confirmation
6

Average Confirmation
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This figure likely underestimates the true effect of confirmation delay, since
it does not account for delays in making nominations in the first place. If
Presidents anticipate difficulties in the Senate, time spent vetting potential
nominees increases, as does the amount of legwork and preparation necessary
before a nomination is formally made- i.e., an increase in confirmation delay
also increases nomination delay. 67
Indeed, during periods of divided
65

!d.

66

ln Part III, we examine how party polarization impacts the appointment and
confirmation of commissioners. In so doing, we highlight how opposition-party senators
make use of holds to advance their party's agenda. See infra text accompanying note 13334.
67 Another reason the figure likely underestimates the true amount of delay is that the
data do not include commissioners who were nominated but never confirmed. Nominees
that were rejected outright or delayed to the end of a session experience the longest
confirmation delays. If rejections or withdrawals are more likely to happen as time goes on,
then looking at just those cases where nominees were confirmed underestimates the true
effect of confirmation delay.
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government, Congress has a weaker incentive to act on presidential nominees
in a timely manner, particularly if the term-expired commissioner shares the
ideology or partisanship of the congressional majority.
As the FEC case suggests, it is also harder for parties within the Senate to
come to agreement about proposed commissioners. 68 As a result, the
nomination and confirmation process has gotten longer on both sides as
Presidents have taken longer to vet potential nominees and Congress has been
slower confirming nominations. As Figure 5 demonstrates, Presidents who
take office during periods of divided government confront about half as many
vacant commissioner slots. 69
During periods of divided government,
commissioners serve longer, arguably because they are more uncertain about
the outcome of future appointments and because more is at stake in
disagreements on the commission.
The willingness of current FEC
commissioners to stay longer than their current terms is likely related to
appointment difficulties created by the disagreement between the Senate and
White House over von Spakovsky's nomination, and more generally by the
disagreements between the parties within the Senate chamber. 70 The aggregate
effect of party polarization is that Presidents have not been able to control
commissions as effectively as they have in the past.

68

Studies of judicial and executive branch appointments likewise underscore that part of
the confirmation delay is due to increasing political polarization. See Sarah A. Binder &
Forrest Maltzman, Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947-1998, 46 AM. J.
PoL. Sci. 190, 197 (2002); Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate
Responses to Executive Branch Nominations 1885-1996, 43 AM. J. PoL. SCI. 1122, 1141
(1999); David C. Nixon & David L. Goss, Confirmation Delay for Vacancies on the Circuit
Courts ofAppeals, 29 AM. PoL. RES. 246,247 (2001).
69 See infra p. 476 fig.S.
70
See Mosk, supra note 61.
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Figure 5: Commissioner Vacancies by Divided Government, 1921 to 2004
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This issue of political polarization is central to our argument; so it is worth
reviewing what social scientists know about this phenomenon. In Figure 6, we
reproduce a figure from political scientist Keith Poole's website on political
polarization.7 1 It graphs the ideological similarity of the Democratic and
Republican parties using a numerical measure of ideology produced by Poole
and his colleague, Howard Rosenthal. 72 This measure uses legislative voting
behavior on different bills by different legislators over time to estimate the
liberalism and conservatism of each member numerically. 73 The figure graphs
the difference between the average liberal or conservative (what they term DNOMINA TE) scores for each party in the House and Senate. Higher values on
this graph imply more polarization since the difference in the parties is greater.

71

THE

NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T . POOLE, & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA:
AND
UNEQUAL
RICHES
(2006), available at
OF
IDEOLOGY
DANCE

http://polarizedamerica.com/; see also Sean M. Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress
(April 25, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://web.austin.utexas.edu/seant/
party_polarization.pdf.
72
KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY
OF ROLL CALL VOTING 233 (1997).
73

See id.
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Figure 6: Party Polarization: Ideological Distance Between Parties, 1879 to
2006
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The figure shows that party polarization has fluctuated over time. Notably,
there was a large difference between the parties in the late nineteenth century,
but this difference narrowed by the middle of the twentieth century. Since that
point, however, polarization has been increasing - and most dramatically so
since the late 1970s. Not only has the average Republican become more
conservative and the average Democrat more liberal, but the divergence of
views within the parties has also lessened. The increased polarization of the
two parties has dramatic consequences for a number of aspects of American
political life, including presidential appointments. As we argue in Part III,
party polarization influences not only the politics of selection, nomination, and
confirmation of appointees, but also the types of persons selected for
commissions and their behavior once at work in these agencies.
III. EXPLAINING THE DATA: PARTY POLARIZATION, COMMISSIONER
TURNOVER, AND THE APPOINTMENT OF PARTY LOYALISTS

In making sense of the data we have assembled, the last picture - showing
the dramatic rise of political polarization - is most telling. As we will now
explain, we think that political polarization has figured prominently both in
presidential efforts to gain control of independent agencies and in efforts by
the opposition party in Congress to limit presidential control. In particular,
polarization contributes to White House efforts to coordinate independentagency policy making through the appointment of like-minded commissioners;
correspondingly, the opposition party in Congress is more likely to use holds
and other confirmation-delaying strategies to resist these presidential efforts
and to advance its competing policy agenda. Likewise, we think that the
increasing propensity of opposition-party commissioners to serve out all or
nearly all of their terms is tied to political polarization. Finally, for reasons we
will soon detail, we think the so-called Reagan Revolution figures prominently
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in this story of presidential appointments, congressional confirmation, and
commissioner turnover. Reagan reshaped the presidency by placing greater
emphasis on ideology in appointing agency heads, emphasizing the President's
power of unilateral action when pursuing policy initiatives, and reshaping the
Republican party in ways that increased the ideological gap between
Democrats and Republicans.
To start, a few words about political polarization and its impact on
presidential administration: 74 "The polarization between the legislative parties
is, perhaps, one of the most obvious and recognizable trends in Congress
during the last thirty years." 75 The political forces that once pushed Democrats
and Republicans towards the center have dissipated. In the South, conservative
"Southern Democrats" have been displaced- both by Republicans who now
occupy conservative seats and by liberal Democrats who occupy the remaining
Democratic seats.76 Likewise, the liberal "Rockefeller Republican" has been
pushed out; the ascendancy of "Ronald Reagan's GOP" in 1980 was linked to
the defeat of the moderate-to-liberal wing of the Republican party. 77
Measures of ideology reveal that the "two parties are perfectly separated":
the most liberal Republican in Congress is more conservative than the most
conservative Democrat. 78 With no meaningful ideological range within either
the Democratic or Republican Party, longstanding gaps between Northern and
Southern lawmakers of the two parties have largely disappeared. 79 Thus, when
legislation is enacted, party cohesion results in a shift in power to party leaders
who "see the lawmaking process as a way to stand behind a unified party

74

The points made in the following two paragraphs are largely drawn from Neal Devins,
Essay, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons from Bill Van
Alstyne's Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1534-39 (2005). That essay looks at the ways that
political polarization has transformed congressional hearings into a mechanism for parties to
advance their pre-existing political agendas.
75 Sean M. Theriault, The Case of the Vanishing Moderate: Party Polarization in the
Modem Congress 5 (May 2, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www .Ia.utexas.edu/-seant/vanishing.pdf.
76
See Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and
Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971-2000, 47 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 305, 306 (2003).
77 See, e.g., Kate O'Beime, Rockefeller Republicans Take Manhattan, NAT'L REv.
ONLINE, July 7, 2004, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NDJiODgzMWQ5NzBhN2
NmYTY I Y2Y4MDUyMDY2NDczZmQ=.
78
108th House Rank Ordering, http://voteview.com/houl08.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2008); see also 109th House Rank Ordering, http://voteview.com/hou109.htrn (last visited
Feb. 14, 2008).
79
Cf Roberts & Smith, supra note 76, at 306. During the Civil Rights era of the 1960s,
of course, there was a sharp North-South (as opposed to Democrat-Republican) divide in
Congress.
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message and, in this way, distinguish their party from the other."80 Rather than
allowing decentralized committees to define Congress's agenda, lawmakers are
more apt to see themselves as members of a party, not as independent power
brokers. 81 For all these reasons, the separation of powers between Congress
and the White House has given way to the "separation of parties."82
Lawmakers advance party interests, not Congress's institutional interests, such
that relations between Congress and the White House are defined by whether
there is unified or divided government. 83
One of the sources of political polarization in Congress is the so-called
Reagan Revolution. Rather than govern from the center, Reagan sought to
transform the Republican Party. By lowering taxes, devolving power towards
the states, and introducing other initiatives intended to reduce people's reliance
on the federal government, Reagan drove a wedge between moderate and
conservative Republicans (and between Republicans and Democrats). As
leader of "[t]he most ideological administration in recent history," Reagan
openly embraced social and religious conservatives. 84 For example, when
running for President in 1980 and 1984, Reagan both pledged to appoint judges
who "share our commitment to judicial restraint" and reached out to social
conservatives by condemning Supreme Court decisions on school prayer,
busing, and - especially - abortion. 85
Equally significant, Reagan sought to revolutionize the presidency. Legal
theorists in the Justice Department and elsewhere spoke about the "unitary
executive" and, with it, the need for presidential control of all governmental
agencies.86 Before the Supreme Court, for example, the administration argued
(unsuccessfully) that "there must be a unitary, vigorous, and independent
Executive who is responsible directly to the people, not to Congress (except by

80 Devins, supra note 74, at 1538; see also C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders,
and Message, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 217 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I.

Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2000).
81 See Devins, supra note 74, at 1539.
82 For a fuller treatment of this topic, see generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H.
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2311 (2006).
83

See id. at 2315.

84

Chester E. Finn, Jr., Affirmative Action Under Reagan, COMMENT., Apr. 1982, at 17,

28.
85 1984 REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM, reprinted in 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 41-B, 55-B
to 56-B ( 1984). In particular, Reagan called for the overruling of Engel v. Vitale and Roe v.
Wade- saying that "God should [never] have been expelled from the classroom," and that
Roe was as divisive and wrong as Dred Scott. Ronald Reagan Remarks and a Question-andAnswer Session with the Student Body of Providence-St. Mel High School in Chicago,
Illinios, 1 PUB. PAPERS 603 (May 10, 1982).
86 For insider accounts, see CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW, ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION- A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 132-71 ( 1991 ); DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 48~65 (1992).
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impeachment)"87 and that "developments since Humphrey's Executor .. . have
cast a shadow over [independent agencies]."88
The administration also sought to centralize power in the presidency through
initiatives on signing statements and regulatory review. 89 Signing statements
were seen as a way to combat congressional efforts to limit presidential control
of the administrative state by leaving it to agencies (and their congressional
overseers) to fill in the details of vague statutory language. 90 Reagan's
regulatory review initiative, expressed in Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498,
were more consequential. 91 Executive Order 12,291 required all executive
agencies to submit proposed policies or rules to the Office of Management and
Budget.92 Executive Order 12,498 required executive agencies to submit their
proposed regulatory agenda and to explain how their agenda advanced the
President's objectives on an annual basis. 93 Through these orders, "the
president and his principal aides [were empowered] to exercise a much greater
degree of influence over executive branch regulation than had existed
previously. " 94
87

Brief for the United States at 33, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1985) (Nos. 851377,85-1378, and 85-1379).
88 /d. at 81 n.32. On the question of independent agencies, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
and expanded Humphrey's. Bowsherv. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,724-27 (1985). In Bowsher v.
Synar, the Court - while invalidating the Gramm-Rudman statute - self-consciously
reaffirmed the legality of independent agencies. /d. at 734-36. For an insightful account of
internal deliberations in the case, see Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During
/986, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 117, 117 (1987). In Morrison v. Olson, the Court affirmed the
power of Congress to restrict presidential removal of an independent counsel exercising
purely executive powers. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 688-93 (1987); see also id. at
724-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the Court's decision goes far beyond the
limits recognized in Humphrey's ).
89 See KMIEC, supra note 86, at 48-57.
90 According to Doug Kmiec, one of the architects of Reagan's signing statement
initiative, the "signing statement was 'crucial for the administration to give the executive
branch direction top-down on inevitable interpretation."' Christopher S. Kelley & Bryan W.
Marshall, The Last Mover Advantage: Presidential Power and the Role of Signing
Statements 6 (April 20, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with All Academic
Research), available at http://www.allacademic.com/metalp 13973 7_index.html (quoting
Interview by Christopher S. Kelley with Douglas W. Kmiec, via E-mail (Apr. 23, 2001));
see also KMIEC, supra note 86, at 52-53.
91 See Christopher S. Kelley, A Matter of Direction: The Reagan Administration, the
Signing Statement, and the 1986 West/aw Decision, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 283, 290
(2007).
92 Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(c), 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981).
93 Exec. Order No. 12,498 § l(a), (b), 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985).
94 GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN'S REGULATORY
DILEMMA 117 ( 1984 ). As one defender of these programs put it: "OMB was to be the
President's eyes and ears in the regulatory field. . . . [Its] job was to ensure that individual
actions taken by federal agencies were well reasoned, economically sound and coordinated
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A third way Reagan sought to coordinate policymaking was through the
appointment of agency heads who shared his deregulatory agenda. Other
Presidents, of course, had paid attention to political patronage and ideological
compatibility when making appointments. 95 But prior administrations had less
assiduously sought loyalty and ideological compatibility. 96
Reagan
emphasized the need for appointees to see themselves as part of a unitary
administration and not as a manager of some discrete agency.97 In particular,
unlike Carter and Ford, who had made subject-matter expertise the hallmark of
their regulatory appointments, Reagan vetted nominees for "ideological
consistency and intensity."98 According to Donald Devine, Reagan's Director
of Office of Personnel Management (OPM), "[a] few months after taking
office, [Reagan] instructed [OPM] that political and philosophical loyalty
should be primary considerations in making appointments."99

with the policies of other agencies." KMIEC, supra note 86, at 48. For similar statements by
Reagan administration officials, see Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White
House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080-82 (1986); see also
TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE: THE CASE FOR THE STRONG PRESIDENCY 16364 ( 1992). For critical assessments of the Reagan initiative, see generally Alan B. Morrison,
Commentary, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a
Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986); Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of

Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order
I2,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1981).
95
For example, during the Eisenhower administration, the President was routinely
accused of "perverting" federal regulatory agencies and "stacking" regulatory boards with
Republican partisans. See Business Control ofAgencies Seen, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1955, at
15; Ike Seen "Stacking" U.S. Boards, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1955, at 2; see also DAVID E.
LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND
BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 11, 32-33, 40-41 (2008). See generally Terry M. Moe,
Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197 (1982)
(demonstrating "gradual, partisan-directed presidential impact" in independent-agency
decision making from 1947-1977).
96 See EADS & FIX, supra note 94, at 141-42; see also RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE PLOT
THAT FAILED: NIXON AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY 39-40 (1975) ("[Officials] were
closeted for long hours in orientation sessions with career program officials, the purpose
being for these career officials to explain to them program goals and accomplishments.").
97
See EADS & FIX, supra note 94, at 140-46; Steven D. Stehr, Top Bureaucrats and the
Distribution of Influence in Reagan's Executive Branch, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 75, 78
(1997).
98 Dick Kirschten, Team Players, NAT'L J., Feb. 19, 1983, at 385 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also EADS & FIX, supra note 94, at 141 (describing the "unusually
uniform probusiness and antiregulation image" of Reagan nominees).
99 DONALD J.
DEVINE, REAGAN'S TERRIBLE SWIFT SWORD: REFORMING AND
CONTROLLING THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 8-9 (1991). After determining whether a
candidate was "commit[ted] to Reagan's objectives," the vetting process took into account
"integrity, competence, teamwork, ... toughness, [and] ... commitment to change."
EASTLAND, supra note 94, at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted). Another commentator
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Reagan's pursuit of the "unitary executive" through appointments, judicial
filings, and regulatory review was a sea change. Perhaps for this reason,
Reagan's regulatory initiatives were resisted by Democrats in Congress. 100
"[A]n all-out assault" was launched in Congress; the law was changed to
require Senate confirmation of the OMB director and there were threats to
defunct OMB review of regulation. 101 With respect to OMB review of
independent agencies, Reagan avoided a fight with Congress, limiting OMB
review to executive agencies. 102 This decision was based on both political and
legal considerations. Legally, the Justice Department cautioned the President
about "the novelty and complexity of the question." 103 Politically, the OMB
was in the middle of the battle over tax cuts and their related defense of
supply-side economics. 104 Rather than spend political capital only to have the
courts reaffirm and extend Humphrey's Executor, the administration took what
they could get from regulatory control: making use of appointments and
judicial filings to gain control of independent agencies. 105
In looking back at Reagan's regulatory revolution, the most striking feature
of Reagan's OMB and appointments initiatives is their permanence. 106
similarly concluded that the Reagan administration sought to determine whether a candidate
was a Reagan supporter, a Republican, a conservative, and a believer in Reagan's view of
government. See Chester A. Newland, A Mid-Term Appraisal- The Reagan Presidency:
Limited Government and Political Administration, 43 PUB. ADMIN. REv. I, 3 (1983).
Correspondingly, because Reagan was more distrustful of the federal bureaucracy than
perhaps any previous President, Reagan regularly appointed agency heads "with
surprisingly little experience in the technical fields regulated by their agencies or offices."
EADS & FIX, supra note 94, at 145; see also James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and
Career Executives: The Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, 47 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 57, 58 (1987).
100
See KMIEC, supra note 86, at 47-65.
101
!d. at 49.
102
See KMIEC, supra note 86, at 58.
103
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REv. I, 28 (1995) (observing that the Justice Department thought both that the President had
legal authority to extend OMB review and that the President might nevertheless lose in
court).
104
In his memoir, OMB director David Stockman makes only one mention of OMB
regulatory review, focusing almost exclusively on tax and spending cuts. See DAVID A.
STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE REAGAN REVOLUTION 11213 (1987).
105
See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (discussing judicial filings) . On
Reagan's staffing of independent agencies, see EADS & FIX, supra note 94, at 140-48
(discussing the role of appointments in the Reagan Revolution); Neal Devins, Congress, the
FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 145-50
(1993) (discussing Reagan appointees to the FCC).
106
After Supreme Court rulings reaffirming independent agencies and upholding the
independent-counsel statute, the Justice Department has largely steered clear oflegal battles
over the legitimacy of independent agencies. See KMIEC, supra note 86, at 58-60. The one
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Ideological loyalty has become a hallmark of presidential appointments.
Consider, for example, Bill Clinton: "[T]he one constant in Clinton's
appointments (including to federal judgeships) was relatively strong
confidence in the nominee's fidelity to the president's agenda." 107 Indeed,
even Clinton's campaign pledge to pay greater attention to racial and gender
diversity in his appointments was interpreted as an effort to appoint political
liberals, with "some senators and interest groups view[ing] ethnicity and

notable exception is a dispute between the Bush I administration and the U.S. Postal Service
over the Postal Service's power to independently litigate postal rate disputes. After Bush I
had lost the 1992 election to Bill Clinton, the President - at the urging of White House
counsel Boyden Gray- demanded the Postal Service kick such disputes over to the Justice
Department. The Postal Service refused, successfully defending their prerogatives in court.
For a discussion of this dispute, see generally Neal Devins, Tempest in an Envelope:
Reflections on the Bush White House's Failed Takeover of the U.S. Postal Service, 41
UCLA L. REv. 1035 (1994). For additional discussion, see infra notes 135-38 and
accompanying text
107 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 131 (2000). A study by Joan Flynn of presidential appointees to
the NLRB, however, argues that Clinton (as well as Bush I) departed from Reagan
administration efforts to push an ideological agenda through their independent-agency
appointments. See Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation
of the NLRB, 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1392-98 (2000). According to this study,
Bush and Clinton both nominated "moderates" to the NLRB, individuals who "would have
been routinely confirmed under the 'old rules."' !d. at 1427. But the National Right to
Work Committee (backed by Jesse Helms and other senatorial allies) pressured both Clinton
and Bush to make more ideological choices. /d. at 1425-28. In this and other ways, Flynn
concludes the Senate seized control of the NLRB. In our view, Flynn's study is useful - but
we draw somewhat different conclusions from the same data. To start, we agree with Flynn
that the confirmation process is more politicized and, as such, the Senate is pushing the
President to nominate more ideological nominees. See supra notes 93-100 and
accompanying text. Unlike Flynn, however, we think that Presidents typically agree with
party leaders from their party- so that same-party nominees are likely to reflect presidential
preferences. See infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text. The fact that a Republican
senator put a hold on a Bush I nomination cuts against, but does not undermine, this claim.
Helms may have taken a position more extreme than most in his party and, in any event,
Bush I was able to appoint commissioners compatible both to his agenda and the agenda of
Senate Republicans. Senate Confirms New Heads of OSHA and MSHA; Late Vote on Two
DOL, Four NLRB Posts Possible, 1989 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 194, at A-4 (Oct. 10,
1989). Cross-party nominees, in contrast, are likely to reflect opposition-party preferences.
See infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text. For this very reason, as Flynn meticulously
details, NLRB appointees are likely to be packaged - so that Presidents will name more than
one commissioner at a time, some Democrat and some Republican. See Flynn, supra, at
1429-32. This practice of "hatching" nominations has become more and more commonand it speaks to the ways party polarization has transformed the dance that takes place
between the President and Senate over the appointment and confirmation of independent
agency heads. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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gender to some extent as rough proxies of nominees' ideology." 108 Clinton's
nominees for cabinet posts "were likewise told, 'These positions are Bill
Clinton's and he appoints them - the Senate-confirmed positions, the
noncareer SES positions, and the Schedule C positions -he selects them. '" 109
The continuing salience of OMB review is even more striking. Jim
Blumstein, nominated in 1990 to head the OMB regulatory-review process, put
it this way: "After [decades] of political and intellectual Strum und Orang on
the issue of centralized presidential regulatory review ... it appears that we are
all (or nearly all) Unitarians now." 110 Blumstein, writing at the start of the
Bush II administration, was referring to the fact that presidential oversight of
the regulatory process had "become a permanent part of the institutional design
of American govemment." 111 Elena Kagan, a senior member of Clinton's
domestic policy staff, boasted that "presidential control of administration, in
critical respects, expanded dramatically during the Clinton years, making the
regulatory activity of the executive branch agencies more and more an
extension of the President's own policy and political agenda." 112 Not only did
Clinton strengthen Reagan-era executive orders, 113 he also made extensive use
of pre-enforcement policy directives to ensure executive agencies followed
presidential understandings when enforcing recently enacted statutes. 114 For
its part, the Bush II administration further extended regulatory review

108

GERHARDT, supra note 107, at 131.
LEWIS, supra note 95, at 24 (quoting Telephone Interview by David E. Lewis with
Emily Sheketoff, (Sept. 29, 2006)).
110
James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An
·Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DuKE L.J. 851, 851-52 (2001).
111
i>ildes & Sunstein, supra note 103, at 15.
112
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2248 (2001).
113
Executive Order 12,866 made explicit what had been implicit in Reagan-era executive
orders, namely, that "centralized presidential regulatory review is aimed at making agency
regulations 'consistent with ... the President's priorities."' Blumstein, supra note 110, at
853 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 2(b), 3 C.P.R. 638, 640 (1994), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (2000)). With respect to independent agencies, the Clinton order required
threm to submit "[a] statement of the agency's regulatory objectives and priorities and how
they relate to the President's priorities." Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 4(c)(A), 3 C.P.R. 638,
642 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000). This demand was symbolically significant
but, ultimately, without teeth - making it minimal in its scope and representing the least
difficult legal path. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 103, at 32-33. That Clinton pushed
the envelope further speaks both to the growing acceptance of OMB review in Congress and
among the regulated community. It also speaks to the fact that Clinton (at the time of the
Executive Order) presided over a unified government and, as such, was not likely to be
subject to congressional reprimand. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 82, at 2327
(discussing the growing importance of party identity in Congress-White House relations).
114
See Kagan, supra note 112, at 2293-96.
109
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Executive Orders, and has also sought aggressively to centralize government
power in a unitary executive. liS
The persistence of Reagan's embrace of centralization, unitariness, and
ideological compatibility demonstrates two phenomena.
First, Reagan's
initiatives strengthened the presidency. "In moving ambitiously down the
paths of politicization and centralization, [Reagan] built a set of administrative
arrangements that by past standards proved coherent, well integrated, and
eminently workable." 116 Consequently, future Presidents presumably would
"have every reason to learn from and build upon the Reagan example in
seeking to enhance their own institutional capacities for leadership. " 117
Second, for reasons we will now detail, Reagan's regulatory initiatives make
more sense today than ever before. When the parties are polarized and the
White House and Congress are divided, Presidents have strong incentives to
pursue unilateral policymaking through loyal appointees. 118
Party polarization and divided government both push the locus of
government authority away from Congress and toward government agencies,
"such that executive and administrative agency action has displaced
lawmaking as the principal source ofpolicymaking." 119 Given the increasingly
divergent ideological agendas of Democrats and Republicans, it becomes more
difficult for Congress and the White House to agree on significant legislation,
especially in times of divided government. 120 Furthermore, even when
115 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007) (amending Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 3 C .F.R. 638 (1994)). For a general (and highly critical) treatment of this
subject, see generally CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007). For a more positive
view of the Bush II administration, see Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential
Signing Statements and Executive Power 32-51 (Univ. Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
available
at
Theory
Research
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
121,
2006),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=922400 (arguing that President George
W. Bush's signing statements do not threaten the separation of powers and may be a helpful
aid in statutory interpretation).
116 Moe, supra note 51, at 271.
117
/d. Some scholars also suggest that "[o ]nee an area of administration has been
politicized it is virtually impossible to reverse the process." Pfiffner, supra note 99, at 59.
118
When Reagan assumed office, the parties were not especially polarized. See supra
notes 74-85 and accompanying text. In other words, Reagan's initiatives foreshadowed
today's era of party polarization. For reasons previously detailed, Reagan's efforts to
transform the Republican Party anticipated a sharp ideological divide between Democrats
and Republicans. See supra p. 4 77 fig.6.
119 Neal Devins, Signing Statements and Divided Government, 16 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 63, 71 (2007); see also Kagan, supra note 112, at 2248-50.
120 Devins, supra note 119, at 71.
Indeed, the combination of party polarization and
supermajority requirements in the Senate limits Congress's ability to enact significant
legislation during periods of unified government if the minority party has at least forty
members in the Senate. But see DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY
CONTROL, LAWMAKJNG, AND lNVESTIGA TIONS, 1946-2002, at 76 (2d ed. 2005).
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Congress enacts legislation, "ideological divergence between Democrats and
Republicans makes it likely that the President and Congress will have
competing spins on legislative meaning." 121
Divided government, relatively unusual before 1955, has become the norm
over the past fifty years. 122 By the end of the Bush II Administration in 2009,
different parties will have controlled the White House and at least one house of
Congress for thirty of the last forty years. 12 3 With the dramatic rise of political
polarization since the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, Presidents invariably
pursue policy initiatives through executive orders, directives, and other
unilateral acts.l 24 Consider, for example, Bill Clinton's health care reforms
and George W. Bush's faith-based initiatives. In both instances, Congress
refused to enact legislation backing the President, and in both instances, Bush
and Clinton advanced their policy priorities through unilateral action. 125
For its part, Congress rarely seeks to overturn unilateral, presidential
action. 126 Congress attempted to overturn only thirty-seven of approximately
1,000 executive orders issued from 1973 to 1998. Of the thirty-seven
congressional bills challenging executive action, only three became law. 127
Rather than confronting unilateral executive actions directly, the opposition
party in Congress instead seeks to wield influence by using its confirmation
and oversight powers to push agt;ncy heads away from presidential priorities
and toward competing congressional priorities. 128 During periods of divided
government, the opposition party can use its oversight powers to hold hearings,
demand that agency heads tum over information, and otherwise attempt to
block executive policy making. 129 Perhaps more importantly, the opposition

121

Devins, supra note 119, at 72.
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 82, at 2330-31.
123
Before the 2000 presidential election, government was unified for only six of the prior
thirty-two years (twenty percent of the time). !d. During the Bush II years, Democrats
controlled the Senate from 2001-2002 and both houses from 2007-2008.
124
See WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 6 (2003); Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, Unilateral Action and
Presidential Power: A Theory, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 850, 851 ( 1999).
125
See Devins, supra note 119, at 67; William G. Howell, Unilateral Powers: A Brief
Overview, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 417, 418 (2005).
126
Devins, supra note 120, at 67.
127
Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15
J.L. ECON. & 0RG. 132, 165-66 (1999); see HOWELL, supra note 124, at 121 ("The
president's powers of unilateral action are greatest when they do not require Congress to
take any subsequent action, something not easily done given the vast transaction costs and
collective action problems that plague the institution.").
128
Devins, supra note 119, at 65.
129
During periods of unified government, when the President's party controls oversight,
oversight takes a back seat to party loyalty. Specifically, party polarization typically results
in comparatively lax oversight - both because there is a greater commitment to party unity
122
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party can use its confirmation power to push the President to nominate agency
heads whom its members find acceptable. 130 In particular, by placing holds on
presidential nominees, the opposition party can block votes on presidential
appointments unless sixty senators vote to break the hold.
Increasing political polarization in Congress has complicated the
confirmation politics dynamic in three ways. First, the stakes are higher.
Political polarization has shifted the focus of government policymaking away
from Congress and to government agencies. Second, the ideological gap
between Democrats and Republicans makes it harder for the President and his
opponents in Congress to agree on a consensus nominee. Third, the President
and his Senate opponents use the appointments and confirmation process more
strategically to advance their respective agendas. Presidents place greater
emphasis on ideological conformity in their nominees; the opposition party in
the Senate increasingly uses its confirmation power to stave off presidential
unilateralism and otherwise push its agenda.
Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that the dance that takes place
between Congress and the White House on confirmation politics has become
so intricate and explosive. 131 Once a process of conflict avoidance and
resolution, "the confirmation process has become conflict seeking rather than
conflict avoiding, conflict magnifying rather than conflict minimizing; and the
root of nearly all appointment conflict is public policy." 132 The advent of party
polarization, something that began immediately before Ronald Reagan
assumed office, marked a dramatic shift in Senate procedures. Starting at that
time, senators "began to hold longer hearings, increasingly used strategic holds
on nominations for political leverage, and increasingly scrutinized
nominees." 133 "Nominees," as an official of both Bush administrations put it,
"are now treated like pieces of legislation, facing the full array of

and because the majority in Congress is more likely to agree with the President's policy
priorities. Devins, supra note 119, at 74-76; Levinson & Pildes, supra note 82, at 2344-46.
130 See Devins, supra note 119, at 70.
131 The 2005 fight over Democratic filibusters of Bush II judicial nominees exemplifies
this struggle. The Republican-controlled Senate was on the verge of approving the so-called
"nuclear option," a change in Senate rules that would ensure up or down votes on all judicial
nominees. Just before the scheduled vote, a group of fourteen Democrats and Republicans
came together to craft a deal that averted that vote. Charles Babington & Shailagh Murray,
A Last-Minute Deal on Judicial Nominees, WASH. POST, May 24, 2005, at AI. For a more
complete treatment of this issue, see generally David S. Law & Lawrence B. Solum,
Judicial Selection, Appointments Gridlock, and the Nuclear Option, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 51 (2006).
132 G. Calvin Mackenzie, The State of the Presidential Appointments Process, in
INNOCENT UNTIL NOMINATED: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS 1, 29 (G. Calvin Mackenzie ed., 2001).
133 Ho, supra note 2, at 28.

HeinOnline -- 88 B.U. L. Rev. 487 2008

488

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:459

parliamentary weapons such as delayed hearings or floor votes, filibusters and
so-called 'holds. "' 134
The increasing politicization of the confirmation process, as we will soon
discuss, has fundamentally transformed the nomination and confirmation of
independent-agency heads. In particular, White House vetting of independentagency appointments, and the Senate's corresponding power to confirm, has
become especially consequential. Presidents cannot fire independent-agency
heads on policy grounds and, as such, have been constrained in their efforts to
direct independent-agency policy making. 135 In particular, unlike executive
agencies, independent agencies need not submit their regulatory proposals to
OMB for approval. 136 They often manage to escape OMB review of budget
requests or at least submit their budget requests to Congress directly at the
same time. 137 Likewise, albeit less importantly, most independent agencies
have substantial litigation authority. Outside of Supreme Court litigation,
which is typically controlled by the Solicitor General, the President cannot use
the Justice Department to ensure the legal policymaking of these independent
agencies remains consistent with presidential priorities. 138
The following picture backs up the preceding analysis. In the post-Reagan
era, confirmation delays of independent-agency heads have grown markedly,
particularly for opposition-party nominations. This change closely correlates
with political polarization, especially given that the President's Senate
opponents increasingly see the confirmation process as a way to defend their
policymaking prerogatives. 139 In one critical respect, the opposition party in
the Senate has succeeded in its efforts - opposition senators regularly use holds
and other delaying strategies to pressure the President to appoint party loyalists
to slots held by opposition-party members.
134
Gary J. Andres, Postcards from Sisyphus: What I Saw During the Confirmation Wars,
35 PoL. SCI. & POL. 55, 55 (2002) (providing a firsthand account of confirmation battles
from a member of the White House Legislative Affairs Staff).
135
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
136
See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text (discussing the Reagan
administration's rationale for excluding independent agencies from OMB review); supra
note 113 (discussing the Clinton administration's decision to ask independent agencies to
provide planning documents to OMB).
137 See David E. Lewis, The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for
Presidential Management in the United States: The Relative Durability of Insulated
Agencies, 34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 377, 389-90 (2004).
138
See generally Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control
over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REv. 255 (1994) (discussing both pros and
cons of this arrangement). On the perils of presidential challenges to independent litigation
authority in court, see Devins, supra note 106, at 1042-50 (discussing Bush I's failed effort
to seize litigation authority away from the U.S. Postal Service).
139
Political polarization and divided government have also resulted in confirmation
See McCarty &
delays of the President's nomination of executive-agency heads.
Razaghian, supra note 68, at 1141.
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Figure 7: Confirmation Delay for Vacancies by Party and Pre/Post-Reagan

Pre-Reagan
• Opposition Party

Post Reagan
• President's Party

Opposition-party success sterns from the fact that the President often makes
multiple nominations to the same commission simultaneously because some
commissioners decide not to complete terms at the very time that other
commissioners' terms expire. This situation allows for "hatching": the
opposition party demands that the President nominate a party loyalist to an
opposition-party slot in exchange for the opposition party supporting the
President's same-party nominations. For better or worse, hatching has become
a common tactic in the modem appointments process. Daniel Ho has both
statistically verified the increase and tied the increase to party polarization
(and, coincidentally, the Reagan Revolution): "measuring 'hatching' by the
number of nominees confirmed two days apart, 24% of nominees were hatched
prior to 1980, compared to 48% after 1980." 140 Examples of this practice
abound, including recent appointments to the FCC, 141 the FEC, 142 the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 143 and the National Labor Relations Board. 144 In
addition to "hatching" multiple members to the same independent agency,
opposition-party senators pressure the President to appoint opposition-party
140

Ho, supra note 2, at 29.
See Mackenzie, supra note 132, at 33 (discussing White House-Senate negotiations
over the appointment of four FCC commissioners in 1997, which included two Democrats
and two Republicans).
142 See Ben Schneider, Senators Await Reid Decision on Handling FEC Nominees,
CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 4, 2007 (discussing 2007 efforts to package the appointment of four
FEC nominees, two Democrats and two Republicans).
143 See Steve Tetreault, Reid Plans to Block Republican NRC Nominee, LAS VEGAS REV.J., July 18, 2007, at 2B (discussing efforts to package a Democratic and Republican
nominee to the NRC).
144 See Flynn, supra note 107, at 1393 n.145, 1429-32.
141
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loyalists to vacant seats on an independent agency by placing "holds" on
presidential nominees that have nothing to do with an independent-agency
appointment. For example, Senate Republicans held up Clinton's U.N.
ambassador pick, Richard Holbrooke, in order to secure the nomination of
Republican Brad Smith to the FEC. 145
Batching has profound consequences on appointments politics. Cross-party
appointees demonstrate particular loyalty to their parties. In the post-1980
period, according to Daniel Ho, "Republican presidents appear to appoint
Democrats [to independent agencies] who are even more liberal than
Democrats appointed by Democratic presidents (and vice versa)." 146 Given the
propensity of commissioners to vote along party lines, 14 7 the ability of the
opposition party in the Senate to push the President this way becomes highly
consequential. As the picture below illustrates, party loyalty affects the
willingness of opposition-party commissioners to resign before the end of their
terms. Consistent with claims we have made about party polarization in the
post-Reagan era, this picture strongly suggests opposition-party commissioners
more often see themselves as party loyalists, such that opposition-party
commissioners more frequently serve out their terms when the President is
from another party. Indeed, while all commissioners now remain for longer
proportions of their terms, this is particularly the case for opposition-party
commissioners.
Figure 8: Commissioner Tenure by Party and Pre/Post-Reagan
Administration
Serve Out Full Tenn
~

Opposition Party

• Pre-Reagan

President's Party

• Post-Reagan

145

Mackenzie, supra note 132, at 33. On occasion, majority and minority leaders of the
Senate also orchestrate deals. See Karen Foerstel, Dozens of Clinton Nominees Win
Confirmation After Lott Strikes Deal with Democrats, C.Q. WKLY., Nov. 13, 1999, at 2714.
14 6 Ho, supra note 2, at 4.
147
See infra notes 153-65 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 88 B.U. L. Rev. 490 2008

2008]

NOT-SO INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

491

The willingness of the opposition party to do battle with the President over
the confirmation of independent-agency heads and the willingness of
opposition-party commissioners to serve through the end of their terms suggest
independent agencies enjoy partial insulation from presidential control. As
Part I made clear, the principal reason Congress chooses independent agencies
over some other institutional design is to limit presidential prerogatives. 148
Limitations on the President's power to remove commissioners as well as the
mandate that the President appoint Democrats as well as Republicans speak to
Congress's hope that opposition-party commissioners will stay in office
through their terms and that opposition-party commissioners will act
independently rather than simply embrace the President's policy agenda. At
one level, it therefore appears that political polarization strengthens the
institutional design of independent agencies - both with respect to the
willingness of opposition-party commissioners to check the President and the
willingness of the opposition party in the Senate to use the confirmation power
to push for commissioners who will not simply rubberstamp the President's
decisions. The question remains: what happens after the President is able to
appoint a majority of commissioners from his party? For reasons we will
detail in Part IV, it seems political polarization also contributes to greater
presidential control of independent agencies after the President has appointed a
majority of commissioners from his party.
IV. CONCLUSION: HOW PARTY POLARIZATION CONTRIBUTES TO
PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

We have demonstrated how party polarization affects commissioner
ideology, the willingness of commissioners to serve out their terms, and the
willingness of the opposition party in the Senate to use delaying strategies to
advance its agenda. 149 For reasons we will now detail, the very forces that
make opposition-party commissioners and senators fight for opposition-party
policy preferences also make it more likely that presidential-party
commissioners and senators will fight for presidential preferences.
Consequently, independent agencies more often polarize along party lines:
they resist presidential preferences when a majority of commissioners are from
the opposition party and support presidential preferences once a majority of
commissioners are from the President's party. While we have not conducted
independent empirical research to buttress our conclusion, so that it should be
considered more impressionistic than other parts of this Article, we feel that
common sense and existing scholarship point to the increasing identity of
interests between the President and independent-agency commissioners from
the president's party. 150 Aside from anecdotal stories published in newspapers
148

See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part Ill.
15
For a competing perspective (limited to NLRB appointees during the Bush I and
Clinton years), see Flynn, supra note 107, at 1413. For reasons previously detailed, we
149

°
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(discussing policy cohesion between independent agencies and the President as
well as the personal commitment of presidential appointees to advance
presidential priorities),l 51 systematic studies of both commissioner voting and
the nomination process support our claim that, in this era of party polarization,
independent-agency heads are especially likely to support the priorities of the
political party they represent. Moreover, the limited empirical research we
have conducted on litigation conflicts between independent agencies and the
Solicitor General supports our claim. 152
As Part III makes clear, ideology plays a more pronounced role in both the
appointment and confirmation of independent-agency heads. Starting with the
Reagan administration, Presidents have placed greater emphasis on a
nominee's commitment to the President's agenda. 153 For its part, the
opposition party in the Senate has chosen to fight fire with fire - so while
Presidents now vet for ideological conformity, the opposition party in the
Senate makes full use of its confirmation power to ensure its nominees are
party loyalists.15 4 Also, as the figure below demonstrates, party unity has
grown markedly since the late 1970s, with both Republicans and Democrats
voting as a unified front on roughly ninety percent of roll call votes. This
graph illustrates the proportion of legislators voting with their own party on
party unity votes over time. These are votes in which a majority of Democrats
voted against a majority of Republicans. Whereas the percentages were quite
high in the late 1800s, indicating that Democrats and Republicans rarely
crossed party lines, the percentages were much lower by the 1950s. Members
from one party more regularly voted with a majority of members from the
other party on important votes in Congress. While there was slightly more
party unity in the Senate than in the House, and some variation in unity around

think that Flynn's analysis is not inconsistent with our claims. See supra note 107.
Moreover, even if her analysis is inconsistent with ours and even if her data substantiate her
claims, Flynn's analysis is limited to the NLRB. See Flynn, supra note 107, at 1365. As
Flynn states, NLRB politics is unique in that presidents often cut a middle path in order to
avoid choosing between business and labor interests. Id. at 1364. For that reason, Flynn
sees Reagan's appointment of pro-business commissioners as anomalous. Id. at 1384; see
infra note 165 and accompanying text (explaining how Reagan transformed the NLRB
through his appointments).
151 For example, there are several journalistic accounts of how Presidents Clinton and
Bush II named commission chairs who were party loyalists. See, e.g., David Hatch, Is the
FCC Free From Partisan Politics?, 2005 NAT'L. J. 2935, 2935 (quoting Clinton FCC Chair
Reed Hundt as saying that he '"naturally ... preferred the White House to approve of [his]
agenda"'); Stephen Labaton, Praise to Scorn: Mercurial Ride of S.E.C. Chief, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. I 0, 2002, at 1-1 (stating that Bush II SEC chair Harvey Pitt "had ultimately become a
casualty ... struggling to remain a loyal Republican without understanding how his
partisanship ... would alienate important Democrats").
152 See infra p. 497 tbl.l.
153
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
154
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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the middle of the century, the steady increase in this practice after the mid1970s is striking. Put another way: with members of each party seeing
themselves as agents for their party, Democrats in the Senate are apt to agree
not just with each other but with other Democrats- whether it is a Democrat in
the White House or Democrats who serve on independent agencies. The same
is also true of Republicans (even more so, since there is greater intra-party
agreement among Republicans). ISS
Figure 9: Proportion of Legislators Voting with Their Party on Party Unity
Votes, 1879-2006 156
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Additional support for this claim can be found in studies of decision making
by independent agencies. 157 A study of seven independent and executive
agencies during the Carter and Reagan administrations underscores the pivotal
role that appointments and confirmation play in agency decision making. 158 In
particular, although reorganizations, congressional oversight, and budgeting
are important, "[t]he leadership of an agency is the most frequent [and most
potent] mechanism for changing agency behavior." 159 Daniel Ho's study of
FCC voting patterns from 1965-2006 likewise points to the pivotal role of
appointees' party identity. By looking at roughly 100,000 votes by forty-six
different commissioners, Ho concludes "[ c]ommissioner partisan affiliation
exhibits robust and large predictive power over votes, even holding constant

155
156

See infra p. 493 fig.9.
Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, & Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America Page,
http://polarizedamerica.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
157 See, e.g., B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control
of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 801, 801 (1991).
158 /d. at 801.
159
/d. at 822.
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the party of the appointing president. This [finding] ... rejects the notion that
expertise exclusively drives decision making." 160 Equally telling, FCC
commissioners have taken steps to demonstrate party loyalty - so much so that
commissioners increasingly file separate statements after a change of
administration, so that Democrats and Republicans could establish "their
reputations for loyalty." 161 Studies of the National Labor Relations Board
reach a similar conclusion - pointing, for example, to the transformative role
of Reagan appointees. These nominees were not the usual "establishment-type
management representatives" that were acceptable to both labor and
business. 162 Instead Reagan pushed for nominees that questioned the Board's
traditional role. 163 In this way, Reagan's nominees were a radical departure. 164
More significant, the Reagan Board's "pattern of decisions changed
remarkably from that of its recent predecessors" - ruling against employers
approximately half the time as compared to Nixon/Ford/Carter Boards that
ruled against employers about eighty percent of the time. 165
One final measure of increasing presidential control over independentagency decision making is the near absence of litigation conflicts between
independent agencies and the Solicitor General's office. 166 During the Nixon
and Carter administrations, these conflicts were common. 167 Even though the
Solicitor General spoke the voice of the "United States" before the Supreme
Court, the Solicitor General would often accommodate independent agencies'
desires to speak with their own voices. 168 In particular, reflecting the fact that
independent-agency decision making did not routinely match executive branch
preferences, independent agencies would sometimes file competing briefs or
make oral arguments that contradicted the views of the "United States." 169
These public disagreements had three sources. First, of course, there was a
disagreement between independent-agency heads and the executive. 170
160

Ho, supra note 2, at 4. For an anecdotal study of the FCC, focusing on how Reagan
transformed agency decision making by appointing commissioners committed to his
deregulatory agenda, see generally Devins, supra note I 05.
161
Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub, Ideology Versus Partisanship: Regulatory
Behavior and Cyclical Political Influence 10 (Legal Stud. Research Paper Series, Paper No.
04-10, 2006).
162
James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221, 248 (2005).
163 Id.
164 !d.
165
Id.
For additional discussion of the NLRB, see supra notes 140-47 and
accompanying text.
166
See infra p. 497 tbl.l.
167
For a fairly comprehensive detailing of significant litigation disputes between
independent agencies and the Solicitor General, see Devins, supra note 138, at 258-59.
168
Id. at 258.
169
See id. at 264.
170
Id. at 280.
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Second, since several independent agencies have independent litigating
authority before the federal courts of appeal, independent agencies had
sometimes staked out a position at odds with the Solicitor General's
preferences. 171 Third, even though the Solicitor General controls nearly all
government litigation before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General thought
it appropriate to inform the Court of both its views and competing
independent-agency views. 172 Carter Attorney General Griffin Bell, for
example, emphasized that Justice Department lawyers "must take care not to
interfere with the policy prerogatives of our agency clients." 173
Over the past twenty-five years, there has been a precipitous decline in the
filing of competing Supreme Court briefs by independent agencies and the
Solicitor Genera1. 174 Starting with Reagan administration efforts to have the
executive speak with a "unitary" voice, Presidents have placed great emphasis
on intra-governmental policy cohesion when appointing independent-agency
heads. 175 Reflecting the Reagan administration view that "the Attorney
General's obligation to represent and advocate the 'client' agency's position
must yield to a higher obligation to [follow the President's lead and] take care
that the laws be executed faithfully," the executive did everything it could to
push its agenda before the courts. 176 Indeed, the Reagan and Bush I
administrations pushed unitariness even when independent agencies publicly
disagreed with executive branch views. 177 In highly visible cases involving the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the U.S. Postal
Service, White House officials sought to convince the independent agency
either to reverse itself or to allow - in cases before federal courts of appeals the Justice Department to present a unified government position,
notwithstanding the fact that these agencies have independent litigation
authority before federal courts of appeal. 178 More recently, the Clinton and
Bush II administrations have prevented the Federal Election Commission and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from presenting their independent
views to the Supreme Court. 179

171
See id. at 274-78 (detailing statutory delegations of independent litigating authority to
independent agencies).
172
/d. at 258.
173
Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and
Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1049, 1061 (1978). For a
fuller discussion of Bell's position, contrasting it to the views of the Reagan administration,
see Devins, supra note 50, at 281-82.
174
Devins, supra note 138, at 288.
175
!d. at 285-86.
176
Devins, supra note 50, at 281 (internal quotation marks omitted).
177
!d. at 282.
178 Seeid. at284-312.
179
Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: Seventy-Five Defenses Securities Litigators
Need To Know, 62 Bus. LAW. 1281, 1293 (2007); George F. Fraley, III, Note, Is the Fox
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Far more striking, the Bush II administration disagreement with the SEC
stands alone. Today, there are almost no public disagreements between
independent agencies and the Solicitor Genera1. 180 As the following table
illustrates, there were no competing filings of four prominent independent
agencies (EEOC, NLRB, FCC, SEC) and the Solicitor General during the
1995-2004 period. Moreover, while there were nine cases out of 157 where
the independent agency did not sign onto a Solicitor General brief, a review of
these cases reveals no merits conflicts between these independent agencies and
the Solicitor General. In dramatic contrast, there were numerous conflicts and
competing filings with all four of these agencies before 1995, and especially
before 1981, when Ronald Reagan became President. 18 1

Watching the Henhouse?: The Administration's Control of FEC Litigation Through the
Solicitor General, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1215, 1219 (1996).
180
See infra p 497 tbl.1.
181
See Devins, supra note 50, at 282 .
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Table 1: Filing of Supreme Court Briefs by Independent Commissions,
1970s to 2004

EEOC
Joint
Agency
SG
Competing

NLRB
Joint
Agency
SG
Competing
FCC
Joint
Agency
SG
Competing
SEC
Joint
Agency
SG
Competing
Total
Joint
Agency
SG
Competing

1970s
4/5 (80%)
0/5
1/5 (20%)
1/5 (20%)
1970s
49/49 (100%)
0/49
0/49
0/49
1970s
5/8 (63%)
118 (13%)
0/8
2/8 (25%)
1970s
5/6 (83%)
016
116 (17%)
016
1970s
63/68 (93%)
1168 (1%)
2/68 (3%)
2/68 (3%)

1995-2004
16/16 (100%)
0/16
0/16
0/16
1995-2004
67/67 (100%)
0/67
0/67
0/67
1995-2004
51/59 (86%)
0/59
8/59 (14%)
0/59
1995-2004
14/15 (93%)
0/15
1115 (7%)
0/15
1995-2004
148/157 (94o/o l
0/157
9/157 (6%)
0/157

It is time to wrap up. This Article has demonstrated that the independentagency institutional design is working as well as it can. The very purpose of
this design was to limit presidential control of independent agencies in two
ways. First, when assuming office, a President would inherit commissioners
from both his party and the opposition party. Congress hoped that oppositionparty commissioners would stay in office through the ends of their terms thereby limiting presidential control of independent agencies. 182 As Figures 1
and 2 show, opposition-party commissioners serve out most, if not all, of their
terms. For this very reason, as Figure 3 illustrates, it now takes the President
longer than ever before to appoint a majority from his party to an independent
agency. Second, Congress hoped that opposition-party senators would use

182

See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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their confirmation power to resist presidential efforts to stack independent
agencies with appointees who backed presidential preferences. 183 As Part III
demonstrated, opposition-party senators are pressuring the President this way.
Through the use of holds and other delaying strategies, which result in the
hatching of nominees from the President's party and the opposition party, the
opposition party has succeeded in forcing the President - when making crossparty appointments - to appoint opposition-party loyalists. Figure 4 backs up
this claim, highlighting increased delays in the confirmation process. The
subsequent discussion, demonstrating that cross-party appointees are especially
ideological, also backs up this claim.
That the institutional design is working as well as it can, however, does not
mean Presidents have less actual control of independent agencies. As we have
detailed in this Part, there is good reason to think that independent agencies
will adhere to presidential preferences once a majority of commissioners are
from the President's party. In particular, party identity is an especially good
proxy for commissioner voting practices. This is tied to two phenomena both of which can be traced to party polarization (and the Reagan Revolution
that contributed to today's polarization). First, as Part III demonstrates,
Presidents look to appoint independent-agency heads who are committed to the
President's policy agenda. Second, as discussed in Parts III and IV, there is no
meaningful ideological gap among Democrats or Republicans. As Figures 6
and 7 show, Democrats are likely to agree with each other and disagree with
Republicans (and vice versa). Party cohesion is not limited to senators; it
applies to independent-agency heads and the President.
Our bottom line is that party polarization plays a defining role in
understanding President-Senate-Commissioner dynamics. Party polarization
makes it likely that opposition-party senators and opposition-party
commissioners will try to check presidential power; party polarization also
contributes to the President's ultimate dominion over independent-agency
decision making.

183

See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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